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Abstract
Background: Highly pathogenic avian influenza A (H5N1) virus has been of public health concern since 2003. Probable
risk factors for A(H5N1) transmission to human have been demonstrated in several studies or epidemiological reports.
However, transmission patterns may differ according to demographic characteristics of the population and local
practices. This article aggregates these data from three studies with data collected in the previous surveys in 2006 and
2007 to further examine the risks factors associated with presence of anti-A(H5) antibodies among villagers residing
within outbreak areas.
Methods: We aggregated 5-year data (2006–2010) from serology survey and matched case-control studies in Cambodia
to further examine the risks factors associated with A(H5N1) infection among villagers in the outbreak areas.
Results: Serotesting among villagers detected 35 (1.5 % [0–2.6]) positive cases suggesting recent exposure to A(H5N1)
virus. Practices associated with A(H5N1) infection among all ages were: having poultry cage or nesting area under or
adjacent to the house (OR: 6.7 [1.6–28.3]; p = 0.010) and transporting poultry to market (OR: 17.6 [1.6–193.7]; p = 0.019).
Practices found as risk factors for the infection among age under 20 years were swimming/bathing in ponds also
accessed by domestic poultry (OR: 4.6 [1.1–19.1]; p = 0.038). Association with consuming wild birds reached borderline
significance (p = 0.066).
Conclusion: Our results suggest that swimming/bathing in contaminated pond water and close contact with poultry
may present a risk of A(H5N1) transmission to human.
Keywords: Environmental contamination, A (H5N1), Human seroprevalence, Risk factors
Background
Highly pathogenic avian influenza A (H5N1) virus has
been of public health concern since 2003, particularly in
south-east Asia and Egypt. The virus causes mass die-off
in domestic poultry, occasionally infecting humans. As
of 04 April 2016, 850 confirmed cases of A(H5N1)
human infections worldwide with 449 deaths have been
reported to the World Health Organization [1]. Probable
risk factors for A(H5N1) transmission to human have
been demonstrated in several studies or epidemiological
reports [2]. However, transmission patterns may differ
according to demographic characteristics of the popula-
tion and practices leading to contact with poultry [3]
and may be impacted by domestic waterfowl density and
local geo-ecological settings [4].
In 2005, the first human case of A(H5N1) infection
was reported in Cambodia, a country of approximately
15 million population. As of 04 April 2016, 56 confirmed
cases have been identified, 37 of these fatal [1]. An
investigation followed the identification of the first four
human cases which found no evidence of mild or
asymptomatic infection in the population [5]. Further
* Correspondence: atarantola@pasteuur-kh.org; buchyphilippe@hotmail.com
†Equal contributors
1Institut Pasteur in Cambodia, Phnom Penh, Cambodia
Full list of author information is available at the end of the article
© The Author(s). 2016 Open Access This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0
International License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and
reproduction in any medium, provided you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to
the Creative Commons license, and indicate if changes were made. The Creative Commons Public Domain Dedication waiver
(http://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/) applies to the data made available in this article, unless otherwise stated.
Ly et al. BMC Infectious Diseases  (2016) 16:631 
DOI 10.1186/s12879-016-1950-z
investigations around the 5th, 6th and 7th human cases
between 2006 and 2007, however, found evidence of mild
or asymptomatic infections among villagers. These early
studies explored the extent of contact with poultry and
potential risk factors for A(H5N1) infections in humans,
underscoring the possibility of an environmental source
[6, 7]. As Cambodia continued to identify more A(H5N1)
human cases during 2008–2010, we conducted three
community investigations. This article aggregates these
data from the three studies with data collected in the
previous surveys in 2006 and 2007 to further examine the
risks factors associated with presence of anti-A(H5) anti-
bodies among villagers residing within the outbreak areas.
Methods
Documenting A(H5N1) circulation in poultry
Within one day after identification of a A(H5N1) human
case, investigation teams from the National Veterinary
Research Institute (NaVRI) and from Institut Pasteur in
Cambodia (IPC) went to the village of the patient and
conducted household visits within a one-kilometer
radius of each case’s house. Household heads were inter-
viewed using a standardized questionnaire, collecting
information on poultry morbidity and mortality during
the past 3 months including number of sick and dead
poultry, dates of onset and symptoms. Venous blood,
tracheal swab and cloacal swab specimens were taken
from ≤10 randomly selected ducks in each household
with duck flocks (chickens being extremely sensitive to
A(H5N1) infection, no samples were taken from appar-
ently healthy chickens). Blood samples were stored in
5 mL tubes without additive. Swab samples were put in
tubes containing viral transport media (VTM) and
shipped at temperature 4–8 °C to NaVRI laboratory in
Phnom Penh within 48 h.
A(H5N1) serological surveys in humans
During 2006–2010, six confirmed A(H5N1)-infected
human cases were identified in five villages of five
Cambodian provinces. Teams from IPC, the Cambodian
Communicable Disease Control Department (Ministry
of Health) and from the World Health Organization
(WHO) conducted serological investigations in humans
within a one-kilometer radius area approximately four to
ten weeks after confirmation of the human A(H5N1)
index cases. The objective was to interview and sample
all villagers using a standardized questionnaire to collect
demographic, poultry exposure and environmental
exposure data for the three months preceding symptom
onset in index cases. For children aged <12 years old,
parents or guardians were interviewed. We used major
social events such as Khmer or Lunar New Year, or
Water Festival as temporal markers to help respondents
recall past activities [3]. Informed consent was obtained
and blood samples (5 mL) collected in tubes without
additive were taken from all members of households and
sent to IPC at temperature 4–8 °C within 48 h for
serology testing.
As two human cases were detected in the same village
successively in April 2007 and December 2009, blood
specimens were collected twice from each subject with
an interval of one month during the second investigation
to draw laboratory conclusion on recent infection and to
serologically rule out previous infection unrelated to the
current event.
Laboratory testing of poultry specimens
Poultry specimens were processed and tested at NaVRI
laboratory as previously described [6]. Tracheal and
cloacal swabs were inoculated into embryonated hen’s
eggs. Allantoic fluid was tested to detect the presence of
influenza virus by hemagglutination, followed by identifi-
cation of H5 virus by hemagglutination inhibition assay
(HIA). Positive (titer ≥1:16) specimens were sent to IPC
for confirmation and virus subtyping using real-time
reverse-transcriptase polymerase chain reaction (qRT-
PCR) targeting the HA, M and NA genes [8]. Duck
serum samples were tested using HIA method using
reference H5 antigen provide by Office International
des Epizooties (OIE). A poultry flock was considered
infected with A(H5N1) virus if one swab sample or
one serum sample tested positive.
Serological testing in humans
Sera from the investigations conducted in 2006 were
shipped to Influenza Division laboratories at the US
Centers for Diseases Control and Prevention (Atlanta,
USA) and sera from the four investigations in 2007,
2008, 2009 and 2010 were tested at IPC.
Sera from 2006 were tested by microneutralization
(MN) assay and when the titer was ≥1:80, the result was
confirmed by a Western blot assay, as recommended by
WHO [6, 9].
Sera from 2007–2009 were screened using H5 hemag-
glutinin pseudotyped lentiviral particles (H5pp) expressing
the hemagglutinin of a 2005 Cambodian H5N1 virus and
those with a titer ≥1:20 were further tested by MN and
hemagglutination inhibition (HI) assay using a 2007
Cambodian H5N1 strain [7, 10]. Antibody titers ≥1:80 in
duplicate MN assays and ≥1:160 in duplicate HI test using
horse red blood cells (HRBCs) were considered positive as
per WHO recommendations [9].
Because the antigenic characteristics of the H5pp
were no longer adapted to the strains detected after
2009, we modified the testing strategy. Beginning
2010, sera were initially screened by HI test using
HRBCs and all samples with titers ≥1:10 were further
tested by MN. In both assays, the viral strain isolated
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during the corresponding outbreak was used. Based
on our findings suggesting that compared to severe
cases, patients asymptomatically-infected developed
lower antibody titers [11], in 2010 we slightly revised
the criteria for positivity as follow: MN titer ≥1:80
associated with HI titer using HRBCs ≥1:80.
Matched case-control studies
When seroprevalence surveys laboratory results became
available, we conducted matched case-control studies by
randomly selecting up to four A(H5N1)-seronegative
subjects as controls for each case tested positive for anti-
H5 antibodies. Controls were identified during the same
investigation as cases and were matched to cases on age
(+/- 3 years), gender, village of residence and households
with suspected/confirmed A(H5N1) infection in poultry
(chicken flock with >20 % mortality or ducks with con-
firmed A(H5N1). A standardized questionnaire was used to
comprehensively document participants’ usual and recent
activities in each affected village with regards to direct
exposure to domestic poultry or wild birds (preparing food,
children playing with poultry, husbandry practices), and
indirect exposure with poultry in their living environment
(house type, poultry cages/area, water source, ponds, rice
field). Interviewers were not informed of respondents’ case-
control status. Parents or guardians were interviewed if
participants were <12 years old.
As we were unable to conduct in-depth interviews in
2009, exposure information was drawn from seroprevalence
data documented for seropositive cases and randomly-
selected, matched control subjects.
Statistical analysis
Statistical analyses were conducted using Stata software
(StataCorp, College Station, TX, USA). All tests were two-
tailed and statistical significance level was set at p < 0.05.
For statistical comparisons, we used Chi2 or Fisher Exact
tests for proportions, Student test for means and Kruskal-
Wallis test for medians. Conditional logistic regression
models and Wald Chi2 test were used in bivariate and
multivariate analyses to calculate maximum likelihood
estimates for the matched odds ratios (OR) and 95 % con-
fidence intervals (CI). All variables showing association at
p < 0.20 with serology in bivariate analysis were included
in the multivariate model using a backward process.
Three multivariate models were constructed with
regards to the age of seropositive cases: (1) one model
for all ages; (2) one for subjects aged less than
20 years; and (3) one model for subjects aged
≥20 years. Age and sex were taken into account in all
multivariate models as possible confounding factors.
All possible two-way interaction terms were tested
separately on the final models and the likelihood ratio
test was examined to find whether interaction terms
significantly improved the model. Population attribut-
able fractions (PAF) were computed for adjusted ORs
associated with increased risk of infection.
Results
Documenting A(H5N1) circulation in poultry in villages
where A(H5N1) human cases occurred
Between years 2006 − 2010, we surveyed 453 households
within a 1-km radius from where the six index A(H5N1)
human cases resided. The proportions of households
with poultry morbidity or mortality ranged from 34 % −
82 % depending on the year. An above 20 % mortality in
chickens was documented in 16 % − 75 % of chicken-
rearing households. Among households whose ducks
were tested, 30 % − 73 % had ≥1 duck which tested posi-
tive for anti-A(H5) antibody (Table 1). Additionally, we
investigated one military training center by testing
poultry raised there and identified H5-positive ducks.
Table 1 Mortality in chicken and serological results in ducks within outbreak areas, Cambodia, 2006-2010
Description 2006 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Village Village 1 Village 2 Village 3 MTC Village 3 Village 4
Province KS PV KC KD KC PV
HH visited 50 119 160 1 68 56
HH with poultry morbidity/mortality 17 (34 %) 93 (78 %) 80 (50 %) 1 30 (44 %) 46 (82 %)
HH raising chickens 44 107 111 1 50 53
HH with chicken mortality >20 % 7 (16 %) 80 (75 %) 67 (60 %) 1 18 (36 %) 32 (60 %)
HH raising ducks 23 59 13 1 11 29
HH where blood samples were collected from ducks 19 33 9 1 10 4
HH with positive ducks for anti-A(H5) antibody 10 (52 %) 24 (73 %) 3 (33 %) 1 3 (30 %) 2 (50 %)
Poultry die-off Approximate start date 07 Feb 2006 15 Jan 2006 01 Feb 2007 15 Oct 2008 05 Dec 2009 25 Jan 2010
Date of symptom onset in human A(H5N1) case 14 Mar 2006 29 Mar 2006 2 Apr 2007 28 Nov 2008 11 Dec 2009 13 Apr 2010
Duration from poultry die-off to clinical onset in human case 35 days 73 days 60 days 44 days 6 days 78 days
KD Kandal, KS Kampong Speu, PV Prey Veng, MTC Military training center, HH Households
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A(H5N1) serological surveys in humans
During 2006–2010, the six serosurveys around identified
human cases among people living in four villages and a
military training center located in four Cambodian
provinces. A total of 2,758 participants were included,
interviewed and sampled. Two surveys were conducted in
Village 3, Kampong Cham province, following A(H5N1)
confirmation in one human case in 2007 and another case
in 2009 (Table 1).
Only data from 2006, 2007, 2009 and 2010 were com-
bined for analyses (n = 2,364). Among the 2,364 partici-
pants, 1,078 (45.6 %) were male, 1,188 (50.3 %) were
farmers and 1,007 (42.6 %) were children or school
students. Median age was 20 years (range: 3.6 months-
99 years; IQR: 3 months-87 years). Serology testing de-
tected 35 (1.5 %) subjects with positive results suggesting
recent exposure to A(H5N1) virus. The prevalence for spe-
cific study years were 1.0 % (7/674) in 2006, 2.6 % (18/700)
in 2007, and 1.6 % (10/624) in 2009. No participant tested
positive in 2010. Of the 35 subjects positive for anti-A(H5)
antibodies, 19 (54.3 %) were male, 15 (42.9 %) were farmers,
19 (54.3 %) were children or school students and the
median age was 16 years (range: 3–77; IQR: 4–70) (Table 2).
Twenty-one (60.0 %) of positive subjects were aged less
than 20 and 6 (17.1 %) were aged between 20 and 39 years.
In 2006, all positive subjects were aged <20 years while this
age group was less represented at 61.1 % in 2007 and
30.0 % in 2009 (p = 0.015).
Among study participants at a military center in
Kandal province in 2008 (n = 394), most were military
trainees (80.7 %), male (87.3 %), aged between 18 and
35 years old (76.4 %), and trainees who stayed at the
center for at least 3 months. These participants all tested
negative.
Factors associated with A(H5N1) infections to human
In total 35 cases and 115 matched control subjects were
enrolled in the case-control studies (pooled data for 2006,
2007 and 2009 excluding military recruits). Bivariate ana-
lysis using conditional logistic regression for matched
case-control analysis identified variables significantly asso-
ciated with seropositivity at a <20 % level (Table 3), which
were included in the multivariate analyses.
Among subjects of all ages, the following exposures
were more frequently reported by cases positive by
A(H5N1) serology compared to matched controls: having
a poultry cage or nesting area located under or right next
to the house (77.8 % vs 52.9 %; p = 0.060); swimming in
ponds also accessed by poultry (40 % vs 30.4 %; p = 0.099);
swimming in ponds also accessed by wild birds (47.1 % vs
29.2 %; p = 0.157); handling sick/dead wild birds (20.0 %
vs. 8.7 %; p = 0.131); and transporting poultry to market
(12.0 % vs. 2.2 %; p = 0.050).
In the subgroup of 22 cases aged <20 and their 77
matched control subjects, the following practices were
more frequently reported among seropositive cases:
Table 2 Characteristics of participants found positive for anti-A(H5) antibodies, Cambodia, 2006−2010
Year of investigation All n (%) 2006 n (%) 2007 n (%) 2009 n (%) 2010 n (%) p value
Participants 2,364 674 700 624 366
Positive for anti-A(H5) 35 (1.5) 7 (1.0) 18 (2.6) 10 (1.6) 0
Positive participants
Gender - male 19 (54.3) 6 (85.7) 8 (44.4) 5 (50.0) - 0.179
Age (years)
Median (min. - max.) 16 (3-77) 12 (4-18) 14.5 (3-77) 26.5 (5-70) - 0.239
Means 24.2 11.4 25.7 30.6 -
Age group
0−4 years 4 (11.4) 2 (28.6) 2 (11.1) 0 - 0.245
5−19 years 17 (48.6) 5 (71.4) 9 (50.0) 3 (30.0) -
20−39 years 6 (17.1) 0 2 (11.1) 4 (40.0) -
40−59 years 3 (8.6) 0 2 (11.1) 1 (10.0) -
>59 years 5 (14.3) 0 3 (16.7) 2 (20.0) -
Age under 20 21 (60.0) 7 (100) 11 (61.1) 3 (30.0) - 0.015
Occupation
Farmer 15 (42.9) 1 (14.3) 7 (38.9) 7 (70.0) - 0.123
Worker - rubber plantation 1 (2.9) 0 1 (5.6) 0 -
Student or child 19 (54.3) 6 (85.7) 10 (55.6) 3 (30.0) -
Participants of 2008 survey were excluded from the analysis (Kandal province, n = 394, military, mainly male aged 18 − 35 years old). None of them tested positive
for anti-A(H5) antibodies
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having a domestic poultry cage or nesting area located
under or adjacent to the subject’s house (81.8 % vs
53.5 %; p = 0.095); swimming in ponds frequented by
domestic poultry (54.6 % vs 36.4 %; p = 0.065) or in
ponds visited by domestic and wild poultry (63.6 % vs
38.1 %; p = 0.119); handling sick/dead wild birds with
bare hands (27.8 % vs 9.0 %; p = 0.059); and eating wild
birds as food (50.0 % vs. 26.9 %; p = 0.054).
Among the 13 cases aged ≥20 years and their 38
control subjects, gathering and placing domestic poultry
in the cages or designated poultry area was somewhat
more frequent among seropositive cases (69.2 % vs.
39.5 %; p = 0.104).
Results from three conditional logistic regression
models are presented in Table 4. Among subjects of all
ages (35 cases and 115 controls), practices that appeared
to be risk factors for A(H5N1) infection in humans after
adjusting for the other variables were: having a domes-
tic poultry cage or nesting area located under or
adjacent to the subject’s house (matched OR: 6.7
Table 3 Bivariate analysis of factors associated with A(H5N1) virus infection in humans, data from matched case-control studies in
2006, 2007, 2009, Cambodia
Characteristic Control Case OR 95 % CI p value (*)
n/N (%) n/N (%)
All ages (n = 115) (n = 35)
Poultry cage or nest located under or adjacent to the house 36/68 (52.9) 14/18 (77.8) 3.2 0.9−11.0 0.060
Having a pond in the house yard 49/115 (42.6) 10/35 (28.6) 0.4 0.1−1.2 0.109
Swimming or bathing in ponds accessed by poultry 35/115 (30.4) 14/35 (40.0) 2.1 0.9−4.8 0.099
Swimming or bathing in ponds visited by domestic and wild poultry 19/65 (29.2) 8/17 (47.1) 2.2 0.7−6.8 0.157
Feeding poultry 84/115 (73.0) 20/35 (57.1) 0.4 0.2−1.0 0.055
Collecting poultry feces for use as fertilizer 22/91 (24.2) 3/28 (10.7) 0.4 0.1−1.4 0.141
Presence of SD animals in the house or house yard 59/92 (64.1) 11/25 (44.0) 0.4 0.2−1.1 0.083
Presence of SD poultry in neighboring households 61/90 (67.8) 12/28 (42.9) 0.4 0.1−0.9 0.023
Handling SD with bare hands 64/115 (55.7) 15/35 (42.9) 0.6 0.3−1.3 0.181
Preparing SD poultry for food 34/115 (29.6) 7/35 (20.0) 0.5 0.1−1.4 0.178
Eating food prepared from SD poultry 57/91 (62.6) 10/28 (35.7) 0.3 0.1−0.8 0.015
Handling SD wild birds 8/92 (8.7) 5/25 (20.0) 2.4 0.8−7.8 0.131
Transporting poultry to trade 2/92 (2.2) 3/25 (12.0) 6.0 1.0−35.9 0.050
Presence of a household member with flu-like illness during the outbreak 60/115 (52.2) 15/35 (42.9) 0.5 0.2−1.2 0.108
Providing care for the case during his/her illness or for the case's corpse 21/92 (22.8) 2/25 (8.0) 0.3 0.1−1.4 0.120
Age <20 years old (n = 77) (n = 22)
Poultry cage or nest located under or adjacent to the house 23/43 (53.5) 9/11 (81.8) 4.1 0.8−21.7 0.095
Having a pond in the house yard 37/77 (48.1) 7/22 (31.8) 0.1 0.02−1.2 0.076
Swimming or bathing in ponds also accessed by poultry 28/77 (36.4) 12/22 (54.6) 2.6 0.9−7.3 0.065
Swimming or bathing in ponds also accessed by wild birds 16/42 (38.1) 7/11 (63.6) 2.9 0.8−11.4 0.119
Feeding poultry 59/77 (76.6) 12/22 (54.6) 0.2 0.05−0.8 0.027
Presence of SD poultry in neighboring households 33/53 (62.3) 6/15 (40.0) 0.4 0.1−1.4 0.145
Handling SD with bare hands 44/77 (57.1) 9/22 (40.9) 0.5 0.2−1.4 0.161
Eating food prepared from SD poultry 31/53 (58.5) 5/15 (33.3) 0.3 0.08−1.2 0.096
Handling SD wild birds 6/67 (9.0) 5/18 (27.8) 3.3 0.9−11.7 0.059
Eating food prepared from wild birds 18/67 (26.9) 9/18 (50.0) 3.5 0.98−12.7 0.054
Age ≥20 years old (n = 38) (n = 13)
Gathering and placing poultry in their cages or area 15/38 (39.5) 9/13 (69.2) 3.0 0.8−11.6 0.104
Presence of SD animals in the house of house yard 16/38 (64.0) 2/13 (28.6) 0.2 0.02−1.8 0.142
Presence of SD poultry in neighboring households 28/37 (75.7) 6/13 (46.2) 0.3 0.07−1.2 0.079
Eating food prepared from SD poultry 26/38 (68.4) 5/13 (38.5) 0.2 0.05−1.2 0.075
OR odd ratio, bivariate analysis using conditional logistic regression model, CI confidence interval, SD sick or died from disease, Case: subject tested positive for
anti-H5 antibodies; (*) only exposure variables included in multivariate analysis (significant level p < 0.2) are shown
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[range 1.6–28.3]; p = 0.010; PAF = 66.2 %) and trans-
porting domestic poultry to market (adjusted OR: 17.6
[range 1.6–193.7]; p = 0.019; PAF = 11.0 %). Factors
that were associated with or bordered on a lower risk
of transmission were: presence of a pond in the house
yard (adjusted OR: 0.2 [range 0.06–0.8]; p = 0.027);
presence of sick animals or animal carcass died of ill-
ness in the house yard (adjusted OR: 0.2 [range 0.04–
0.6], p = 0.008); and providing care for the A(H5N1)
index case during the illness or the case's corpse
(adjusted OR: 0.17 [range 0.03–0.97]; p = 0.046).
In subjects aged <20 years (22 cases and 77 controls),
practices found to be risk factors for A(H5N1) infection
were swimming in ponds accessed by domestic poultry
(adjusted OR: 4.6 [range 1.1–19.1]; p = 0.038; PAF =
42.7 %). Eating wild birds (adjusted OR: 4.9 [range 0.9–
26.8]; p = 0.066; PAF = 39.8 %) bordered on statistical
significance. Practices associated with a lower risk was
routinely feeding household poultry (adjusted OR 0.2;
[range 0.03–0.8]; p = 0.03).
In subjects aged ≥20 years (13 cases and 38 controls),
gathering and placing poultry in their cage/nesting area
bordered on statistical association with A(H5N1) infec-
tion (adjusted OR: 4.3 [range 0.9–21.5]; p = 0.072; PAF =
53.1 %) while eating sick/dead poultry tended to be pro-
tective (adjusted OR: 0.1 [range 0.021–1.0]; p = 0.055).
Discussion
Four consecutive serological surveys in humans con-
ducted around identified cases during four of five years
(2006–2010) by the same Khmer-speaking Cambodian
field epidemiology team experienced in administering
the same standardized questionnaire and collecting sam-
ples documented a low prevalence of A(H5N1) anti-
bodies. These samples were analyzed by a reference
diagnosis laboratory virology for A(H5N1). Although
reference A(H5N1) diagnostic procedures improved with
time, seroprevalence remained comparable across the
years and even receded. At 1.5 % (ranging from 1.0 % in
2006 − 2.6 % in 2007), this low prevalence is in line with
findings among populations not involved in poultry
culling or sales, mainly in rural settings [1, 12–17].
The nested matched case-control study was under-
taken to identify risk factors for transmission among
those with evidence of recent infection by A(H5N1).
Exposure to A(H5N1) translates into infection risks at
any age including young adults. When considering all
age groups, having a poultry cage directly below the
floor of stilt houses or appended to non-stilted houses
was a significant independent risk factor. This confirms
findings from studies in China [18] and Thailand [19]
showing that living in close proximity to dead or sick
poultry shedding virus or poultry increases infection
risk. Transporting poultry to markets or collection sites
was also an independent factor when all age groups were
considered.
Childhood activities such as swimming in village ponds
was significantly associated with recent A(H5N1) infection
(OR: 4.6; p = 0.038), confirming data from previous studies
in Cambodia [6, 7]. In villages located far from the river,
the alternative water source and water storage can be a
small pond for washing/bathing, drinking/cooking,
Table 4 Multivariate analysis of risk factors associated with A(H5N1) virus infection in various age groups, data from seroprevalence
surveys in 2006, 2007 and 2009, Cambodia
Characteristic OR 95 % CI p value Prevalence among cases (%) PAF (%)
All ages (35 cases and 115 control subjects)
Poultry cage or place located under or attached to the house 6.7 1.6-28.3 0.010 77.8 66.2
Presence of a pond in the house yard 0.2 0.06-0.8 0.027 28.6 -
Presence of sick animals or animal that died from disease in
the house yard
0.2 0.04-0.6 0.008 44.0 -
Transporting poultry to trade 17.6 1.6-193.7 0.019 12.0 11.0
Providing care for the case during the illness or for the case's corpse 0.17 0.03-0.97 0.046 80.0 -
Age under 20 years old (22 cases and 77 control subjects)
Swimming or bathing in ponds also accessed by poultry 4.6 1.1-19.1 0.038 54.6 42.7
Feeding poultry 0.2 0.03-0.8 0.030 54.6 -
Eating food prepared from sick poultry or poultry that died from disease 0.2 0.02-1.0 0.051 33.3 -
Eating wild birds 4.9 0.9-26.8 0.066 50.0 39.8
Age ≥20 years old (13 cases and 38 control subjects)
Gathering and placing poultry in their cages or nests 4.3 0.9-21.5 0.072 69.2 53.1
Eating food prepared from sick poultry or poultry that died from disease 0.1 0.02-1.0 0.055 38.5 -
OR odd ratio, multivariate analysis using conditional logistic regression model, CI confidence interval, PAF Population Attributable Fraction
Ly et al. BMC Infectious Diseases  (2016) 16:631 Page 6 of 9
gardening and sometimes raising fish or ducks. Ducks that
can potentially be infected by A(H5N1) virus have access
to these communal ponds and may defecate/shed large
quantities of virus in pond water [20–22]. A(H5N1) infec-
tions in two children in Vietnam may be linked to swim-
ming/bathing in canal water also accessed by ducks [23].
Testing of environmental specimens taken from the ponds
in A(H5N1)-affected area detected viral RNA in several
samples including mud, water and aquatic plants [24, 25].
Experiments have shown that infectious particles of
A(H5N1) virus may survive in water and fauna for days
even at high temperature, demonstrating the potential
threat of contaminated ponds [26]. Moreover, studies in
Vietnam [27] and Thailand [28] showed that documented
human cases of A(H5N1) infection were significantly asso-
ciated with lack of indoor water sources.
Another identified activity common among children in
the Cambodian countryside is preparing and consuming
wild birds such as sparrows and cranes. The association
of consuming wild birds with markers of recent
A(H5N1) infection bordered on significance (OR: 4.9;
p = 0.066). These birds are traditionally shot down or
trapped and grilled over a small fire in the fields. Often,
the deepmost internal parts of the bird are not fully
cooked. Human cases of infection with A(H5N1) virus
following direct exposure to dead wild birds were reported
in Azerbaijan [29] and consuming uncooked duck blood
has been suggested as a source of infection in some cases
in Vietnam [30]. It has also been experimentally shown
that small sparrows could theoretically be infected after
contact with infected poultry and serological evidence of
influenza contamination of these birds has been found in
Cambodia [31].
In Cambodia, gathering or placing poultry in cages is
usually done by older persons (aged 20 or above). The
association of this practice with biological signs of recent
infection bordered on significance (OR: 4.3; p = 0.072).
The link between this activity and A(H5N1) infection
was also well documented in Egypt [32].
Some factors were statistically associated with a lower
risk of having markers of recent A(H5N1) infection. In
subjects of all age, having a (private) pond in the house
yard or presence of sick or dead poultry in the house
yard were protective factors (OR: 0.2, p = 0.027 and OR:
0.2, p = 0.008 respectively). This is not paradoxical when
the Cambodian context is taken into account. Having a
pond in the yard entails a lesser probability of interact-
ing with sick poultry in these private, well-maintained
and protected ponds than in the communal ponds
described above. Additionally, it provides better access
to water and perhaps better personal hygiene practices
such as hand washing after handling sick poultry. Having
sick or dead poultry in the house yard is not in itself a
good proxy for A(H5N1) circulation among poultry in
Cambodia, where many co-circulating pathogens cause
poultry death [33]. Furthermore, households in which
poultry deaths occurred may be more prone to observe
prevention messages and implement preventive measures.
The latter was equally true of “providing care for an
identified human case of A(H5N1)”, also found to be
protective. Despite one human-to-human transmission
event in Thailand, available epidemiological data show
that A(H5N1) transmission to those providing care is
extremely rare [34, 35]. Furthermore, our detailed inter-
views showed that most study subjects who declared
they provided care actually did little more than visit the
human cases, without close or prolonged contact.
Paradoxically, eating food prepared from sick or dead
poultry tended to be a protective factor. Although con-
suming well-cooked meat of infected poultry is well docu-
mented as posing little or no risk [36], the fact that this
bordered on significance and appeared in independent
analyses for both age groups but not in all-age analysis
suggest that this is an artefact.
Among subjects aged below 20, feeding poultry was
associated with a lower risk of recent A(H5N1) infection.
Feeding poultry was understood in these surveys as a
habitual activity of feeding live poultry. As backyard
flocks in our settings were overwhelmingly constituted
of chickens and not ducks, this activity was likely inter-
rupted by signs of disease in the poultry and did not
incur exposure to A(H5N1).
Our findings are subject to bias and limitations. Firstly,
factors investigated were suggested by the literature and
profound knowledge of the Cambodian setting but some
additional factors may have been missed, such as indi-
vidual host genetic factors [36]. However, this case-
control study with cases matched on age (±3 years) and
gender and the presence of A(H5N1) detected in at least
some household poultry in the same villages naturally
adjusts for many unidentified but possibly linked factors,
such as host genetics in these Cambodian villages with
low ethnic intra-village diversity.
Secondly, technical limitations may have biased our
findings. During the five-year period, progressively im-
proved assays may alter the year-to-year comparability
of seroprevalence findings and the characteristics of
cases. This improvement of diagnostic methods is to be
expected from a reference laboratory and is unavoidable,
but using the most recent reference strains improved
detection in cases and therefore increased the sensitivity
in our detection of factors associated with higher risk. In
addition, if the screening approach differed over the
time, the criteria for positivity essentially only slightly
changed in 2010 after one of our study suggested that
asymptomatically-infected individuals were expected to
have lower antibody titers than severe human H5N1 cases.
Thirdly, A(H5N1) antibodies decay could theoretically be
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associated with false-negative findings in study subjects
[11]. Our seroprevalence surveys, however, were conducted
within four weeks of the detection of index cases and
poultry die-off.
Finally, our study is based on a limited number of sur-
veys and cases. Although low power may explain border-
line significance of some findings, a total of 35 cases and
115 controls provides adequate power to detect factors
with a strong association, which are the most relevant in
terms of public health and prevention. Furthermore, the
fact that these were documented across several years in
different villages reduces the risk of documenting risk or
protective factors in a single setting at a single moment
in time. Investigators who interviewed and sampled par-
ticipants were de facto blind to subsequent serological
results, adding to the reliability of the study findings.
Conclusion
Our findings from surveys conducted over several years
in several different villages identifying proximity to poultry
cages and swimming in communal ponds accessed by
humans and poultry can reliably be extrapolated to the
general Cambodian setting. Additionally, these surveys
were conducted in the general population, not in high-risk
groups such as veterinarians or poultry workers.
Findings were communicated to public health authorities
who have since reinforced prevention messages. The identi-
fication of possible increased risks of A(H5N1) infection
linked with hunting and consuming wild birds in Cambodia
warrants further and careful study. Additional work is being
conducted on documenting possible genetic polymor-
phisms associated with increased vulnerability or resistance
to A(H5N1) infection in humans [34].
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